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Fast-Track Sentencing Disparity: Rereading
Congressional Intent to Resolve the Circuit Split
Thomas E. Gormant
INTRODUCTION

Early disposition programs -commonly referred to as "fasttrack" sentencing programs-allow a federal prosecutor to offer a
below-Guidelines sentence in exchange for a defendant's prompt
guilty plea and waiver of certain pretrial and postconviction rights.
Typically, fast-track sentencing is used to quickly process an overwhelming caseload of immigration offenses. Fast-track programs received official sanction when Congress, in the 2003 PROTECT Act,'
directed the Sentencing Commission to authorize them. This authorization requires both the local US Attorney and the Attorney General
to approve the implementation of each program.
Presently, fast-track sentencing is approved in just a fraction of
judicial districts. Therefore, not all defendants are eligible for a reduced
fast-track sentence, and eligibility is dependent on where the defendants are found and prosecuted. Defendants in non-fast-track districts
argue that this geographic disparity implicates 18 USC § 3553(a)(6),
which requires sentencing courts to consider "the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who
have been found guilty of similar conduct."2 These defendants argue that
sentencing courts in non-fast-track districts have the discretion to grant
below-Guidelines sentences to mitigate the disparity.

t BA 2004, Columbia University; JD Candidate 2010, The University of Chicago Law
School.
An excerpt from this Comment was published previously. See Thomas E. Gorman, A History
of Fast-Track Sentencing, 21 Fed Sent Rptr (Vera) 311 (2009).

1 Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act
of 2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub L No 108-21, 117 Stat 650.
2
18 USC § 3553(a)(6).
3
See, for example, United States v Gomez-Herrera,523 F3d 554, 557 (5th Cir 2008), cert
denied 129 S Ct 624 (2008). Some argue that sentencing courts must mitigate the disparity, see
United States v Castro,455 F3d 1249, 1251-52 (11th Cir 2006), but this stronger claim is beyond
the scope of this Comment.
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Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Kimbrough v United
States, the circuit courts uniformly agreed that sentencing courts
could not mitigate the fast-track disparity. In Kimbrough, the Court
stressed that the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory, and that sentencing courts have broad discretion to impose a below-Guidelines sentence if it is necessary to ensure that the sentence is "sufficient, but
not greater than necessary."' The Supreme Court further clarified that
if Congress wants to limit this discretion, it must do so explicitly.' In
light of this decision, the circuits have begun to reconsider their
precedent on fast-track sentencing, and a split has developed over
whether courts in non-fast-track districts may impose belowGuidelines sentences to mitigate the sentence disparity. The First Circuit now holds that "sentencing courts can consider items such as fasttrack disparity" when deciding whether to grant a below-Guidelines
sentence.' The Third Circuit concurs.! By contrast, the Fifth, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits continue to hold that sentencing courts may not
take fast-track disparities into account when considering whether to
impose a below-Guidelines sentence.
This Comment argues that the circuit courts have each erred by
unduly focusing on a single sentence in Congress's ambiguous authorization of fast-track in the PROTECT Act.'0 The courts mistakenly
ignore the larger purpose and context of that legislation through their
narrow focus. A thorough examination of congressional efforts to
reform sentencing is more fruitful than a limited focus on the vague
authorization of fast-track. For the last thirty years, Congress has consistently prioritized two goals: promoting harsh sentences and reducing unwarranted sentencing disparities. These goals are also what
drove Congress to authorize a limited form of fast-track sentencing in
the PROTECT Act. This Comment argues that granting sentencing
courts the discretion to mitigate the fast-track disparity is more supportive of Congress's goals than any alternative. This approach mitigates an enormous disparity between defendants, and has only a tiny
effect on the aggregate harshness of the sentencing system. And, the
552 US 85 (2007).
Id at 101, quoting 18 USC § 3553(a).
Id at 102-03.
7
United States v Rodriguez, 527 F3d 221,231 (1st Cir 2008).
8
United States vArrelucea-Zamudio,581 F3d 142,149 (3d Cir 2009).
9 See Gomez-Herrera,523 F3d at 564; United States v Gonzalez-Zotelo, 556 F3d 736,741 (9th
Cir 2009), cert denied 130 S Ct 83 (2009); United States v Vega-Castillo,540F3d 1235,1238-39 (11th Cir
2008), rehearing en banc denied, 548 F3d 980 (11th Cir 2008), cert denied 129 S Ct 2825 (2009).
10 See PROTECT Act §401(m)(2)(B), 117 Stat at 675.
4
5
6
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pro-discretion approach is more consistent with the Supreme Court's
recent rulings defending judicial discretion. Therefore, this Comment
argues that the First and Third Circuits, despite their unduly narrow
analytical focus, have reached the right outcome in allowing belowGuidelines sentences to mitigate the fast-track disparity.
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I first explains the history of sentencing reform broadly. It then specifically explains the history of fast-track programs, from their development as a prosecutorial
tool, through the PROTECT Act's authorization of fast-track, to recent trends in the use of fast-track programs. Part II summarizes several recent Supreme Court cases on sentencing, including the pivotal
Kimbrough decision, to provide context for the fast-track sentencing
debate. Part III then details the circuit split that has developed in the
wake of Kimbrough. Finally, Part IV argues that courts in non-fasttrack districts should be able to impose below-Guidelines sentences to
mitigate the fast-track disparity. That approach is more supportive of
Congress's goals, and it is more supportive of the trend in recent Supreme Court cases to grant broad discretion to sentencing courts.
I. A HISTORY OF SENTENCING REFORM AND

FAST-TRACK SENTENCING

A. Congressional Sentencing Reform
Through most of the twentieth century, a highly discretionary, rehabilitative, "medical" model dominated criminal sentencing." Federal
judges had broad discretion to choose whatever penalty they felt appropriate for each defendant, within a broad range of statutorily permissible sentences.12 And the parole system, by haphazardly releasing
offenders before their full sentences had been served, exacerbated the
indeterminacy of sentencing." This uncertainty in criminal penalties
sparked significant criticism throughout the mid-twentieth century.
Though there were a number of attempts by Congress to reform the

1

See Marvin E. Frankel, Criminal Sentences: Law without Order 87-93 (Hill and Wang

1973) (describing the rehabilitative model and arguing that it results in indeterminate sentences
and vagueness in the law).
12 United States Sentencing Commission, Fifteen Years of Guidelines Sentencing: An Assessment of How Well the Federal Criminal Justice System is Achieving the Goals of Sentencing

Reform xviii (Nov 2004), online at http://www.ussc.gov/15_year/15_year-studyfull.pdf (visited
Nov 15, 2009).
13 Kate Stith and Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 Wake Forest L Rev 223,226-27 (1993).
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discretionary, rehabilitative model of sentencing, the push that eventually led to the Sentencing Guidelines, launched by Senator Ted
Kennedy, only gained momentum after 1975. The legislation that
eventually became the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984" (SRA) was
"sponsored and shepherded through Congress by an unusual coalition
of liberals and conservatives."" Conservatives wanted to eliminate the
indeterminacy created by the parole system and institute harsher sentences for drugs and violent crime." Liberals wanted uniform guidelines to prevent the arbitrary disparities endemic to discretionary"
(and sometimes biased 9 ) sentencing. The stark contrast between these
two constituencies is notable because it reveals Congress's dual objectives for sentencing reform: the liberals wanted to eliminate arbitrary
disparities; the conservatives wanted harsher sentences.
In 1984, Congress finally passed the SRA, which created the
United States Sentencing Commission (USSC) and the Sentencing
Guidelines, and made the Guidelines binding on sentencing courts."'
14 See United States Sentencing Commission, The FederalSentencing Guidelines:A Report
on the Operation of the Guidelines System and Short-Term Impacts on Disparity in Sentencing,
Use of Incarceration,and ProsecutorialDiscretion and Plea Bargaining9-12 (Dec 1991) (outlin-

ing the history of federal sentencing reform culminating in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984).
15 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA), Pub L No 98-473, ch 2, 98 Stat 1987, codified as
amended at 18 USC § 3551 et seq and 28 USC § 991 et seq.
16 James M. Anderson, Jeffrey R. Kling, and Kate Stith, Measuring Interjudge Sentencing
Disparity:Before and after the FederalSentencing Guidelines,42 J L & Econ 271, 272 (1999). See
also Kenneth R. Feinberg, Federal Criminal Sentencing Reform: Congress and the United States

Sentencing Commission, 28 Wake Forest L Rev 291,292-93 (1993) (noting that the bipartisanship
of the coalition backing the SRA-led by Senators Ted Kennedy, Joe Biden, Strom Thurmond,
and Orrin Hatch-explains the important compromise provisions of the USSC's enabling legislation, as well as some of the criticism directed at the Commission's work).
17

See Kate Stith and Jos6 A. Cabranes, Fearof Judging:Sentencing Guidelines in the Fed-

eral Courts 42-43 (Chicago 1998) (noting that a changed political configuration-namely President Ronald Reagan's election and Senator Thurmond's chairmanship of the Judiciary Committee-led to the Act's elimination of parole and the addition of tough-on-crime provisions).
18 See Anderson, Kling, and Stith, 42 J L & Econ at 272 (cited in note 16) (noting liberals'
concern that discretionary sentencing posed a threat to equal treatment under the law). See also
Edward M. Kennedy, Criminal Sentencing: A Game of Chance, 60 Judicature 208, 209-11 (1976);
William B. Eldridge and Anthony Partridge, The Second CircuitSentencing Study: A Report to the

Judges of the Second Circuit 10 (FJC 1974) (studying sentences imposed in the Second Circuit and
noting that the "consistent tenor of the data presented" was one of "substantial disparity").
19 See Sentencing Guidelines, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 100th Cong, 1st Sess 676-77 (July 23, 1987) (statement of
Ilene H. Nagel, United States Sentencing Commission) (presenting statistical data showing
significant disparities in sentences given in different districts and to different sexes and races).
20 For a history of the SRA and the Guidelines, see Stith and Cabranes, Fear of Judging at
38-77 (cited in note 17). For a description of the Guidelines' genesis, see generally Stephen
Breyer, The FederalSentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17

Hofstra L Rev 1 (1988).
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The SRA enforced harsh sentences and reduced unwarranted disparities by eliminating parole and structurally preventing departures from
the mandatory Guidelines. 2' Departures were technically allowed under 18 USC § 3553(b), but they were strongly discouraged." The SRA
created one-sided appealability rules: a non-Guidelines sentence
could be appealed on the grounds that it was "unlawful or unreasonable under the circumstances," but a court's decision not to depart was
within its discretion and unappealable." Therefore, judges had an incentive to sentence within the Guidelines, since doing so eliminated
the risk of reversal." In addition, the Guidelines specifically listed the
factors -such

as diminished capacity or duress" -that were approved

as justifications for a downward departure.' Other arguably relevant
factors-like vocational skills, employment record, or military service" -were either implicitly or explicitly excluded.2
This system sharply constricted the use of below-Guidelines sentences and eliminated most opportunities for judges to insert their
own discretion into sentences.29 Yet Congress repeatedly expressed
concern that the rate of downward departures was still too high. For
example, in 1995, members of the House Judiciary Committee held
USSC oversight hearings" over the "role of judicial discretion as evidenced by the rate of guideline departures."' A USSC representative
Stith and Cabranes, Fear of Judging at 40,43 (cited in note 17).
Id at 72. A "downward departure" occurs when the sentencing judge imposes a sentence
below the floor of the applicable Guideline range.
23 Id at 73.
24
Id.
25
USSG § 5K2.13 (diminished capacity); USSG § 5K2.12 (duress). The USSC essentially
allowed judges to downwardly depart only on characteristics that would have provided an affirmative defense under the common law. Compare USSG §§ 5K2.10-13 with Joshua Dressler,
21
22

Understanding Criminal Law 237-68,323-42,393-402 (LexisNexis 2006).
2
Stith and Cabranes, Fear of Judging at 74-75 (cited in note 17); USSG § 5K2 (listing
factors that are, and are not, acceptable bases for departures from the Guidelines range).
27
USSG § 5H1.2 (vocational skills); USSG § 5H1.5 (employment record); USSG § 5H1.11
(military service).
28
See, for example, USSG ch 5,pt H (describing the many factors that are "not ordinarily relevant" in determining "whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range"). The
USSC was not required by law to exclude so many individual characteristics from consideration, but
instead did so on its own accord. See Stith and Koh, 28 Wake Forest L Rev at 283 (cited in note 13).
29
See Stith and Cabranes, Fear ofJudging at 82-83 (cited in note 17).
3o See generally United States Sentencing Commission, Hearing before the Subcommittee
on Crime of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (June 29, 1995) ("Subcommittee on Crime Hearing").
31 United States Sentencing Commission, Report to Congress: Downward Departures from

the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (In Response to Section 401(m) of Public Law 108-21) B-21

(Oct 2003) ("Downward Departures Report"), online at http://www.ussc.gov/departrpt03/
departrptO3.pdf (visited Nov 11, 2009).
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generally defended the use of downward departures," but said that he
wanted to conduct further investigation into prosecutorial practices
that could "lead to increased disparity in sentencing."" In 2000, the
Senate also held an oversight hearing on the USSC. Republican senators on the Judiciary Committee worried that the "increasing trend of
sentencing criminals below the range established in the Guidelines"
served to undermine mandatory sentencing. The USSC's representative
commented that geographic disparities could be at odds with the SRA.
Thus, Congress has consistently focused on two goals in its sentencing legislation and oversight. First, Congress has been particularly
interested in reducing unwarranted disparities. Second, Congress has37
demonstrated an interest in increasing the harshness of sentences.
These competing goals resulted in a compromise in the SRA between
liberal reformers and law-and-order conservatives.7 These two objectives should be the overarching focus of courts evaluating sentencing

32
Subcommittee on Crime Hearing, 104th Cong, 1st Sess at 16 (cited in note 30) (prepared
statement of Judge Richard P.Conaboy, Chairman, United States Sentencing Commission).
33
United States Sentencing Commission, Downward DeparturesReport at B-22 (cited in
note 31). Later, the USSC became much more critical of departures in the context of the fasttrack sentencing disparity. See id at 66-67 ("Defendants sentenced in districts without authorized early disposition programs, however, can be expected to receive longer sentences than
similarly-situated defendants in districts with such programs. This type of geographical disparity
appears to be at odds with the overall Sentencing Reform Act goal of reducing unwarranted
disparity among similarly-situated offenders.").
3

Oversightof the United States Sentencing Commission:Are the Guidelines Being Followed?,

Hearing before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 106th Cong, 2d Sess (2000) ("Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight Hearing").
35 Id at 1 (statement of Sen Strom Thurmond). See also id at 3 (statement of Sen Jeff Sessions). Democratic senators expressed less concern. See, for example, id at 74 (statement of Sen
Patrick J. Leahy) (stating his disagreement with the Republicans' belief that it was necessary to
change the sentencing laws because judges were granting too many downward departures and
undermining the Guidelines).
36
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight Hearing at 18 n 1 (cited in note 34) (statement of John R. Steer, Vice Chair, United States Sentencing Commission).
37 Stith and Koh, 28 Wake Forest L Rev at 284-85 (cited in note 13) ("[I]t is clear that
Congress desired a significant degree of rigidity and harshness in the sentencing guidelines."). As
one professor described it, "Once a determinate sentencing bill is before a legislative body, it takes
only an eraser and pencil to make a one-year 'presumptive sentence' into a six-year sentence for the
same offense." Franklin E. Zimring, A Consumer's Guide to Sentencing Reform- Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 6 Hastings Center Rep 13, 17 (1976). Since enacting the SRA, it seems that
Congress only gets involved in sentencing to increase the harshness of criminal sentences. See
Rachel E. Barkow, AdministeringCrime, 52 UCLA L Rev 715,769-70 (2005) (noting that Congress
has repeatedly passed legislation mandating higher penalties or directing the USSC to increase
Guidelines ranges, and has rejected USSC proposals to lower the Guidelines).
38 See Stith and Koh, 28 Wake Forest L Rev at 285-86 (cited in note 13) (arguing that compromises made by liberals in passing the SRA were an inevitable result of the legislative process).
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legislation, and they are the basis of this Comment's solution to the
fast-track circuit split.
B.

An Explosion in Cases and the Creation of Fast-Track Sentencing

The first fast-track programs were implemented by various US
Attorneys in the mid-1990s without any congressional warrant. These
programs helped manage an exploding volume of immigration-related
cases. This radical increase in immigration cases was driven by two
factors. First, in the 1990s, federal law enforcement agencies dramatically increased their enforcement of immigration offenses. The Border
Patrol grew rapidly in size and in budget." The federal government
also launched a series of high-profile operations to interdict illegal
immigration." Overall, apprehensions jumped from less than
1.2 million per year in 1992 to more than 1.6 million in 2000.41 Second,
a small provision in the 1994 omnibus crime bill both enhanced the
penalties for illegal reentry after deportation and expanded the offense's applicability to more defendants.4 This gave prosecutors more
sentencing room to craft plea bargains with more defendants.43 Quick
plea bargains saved prosecutorial resources, which in turn allowed the
US Attorney's Offices (USAOs) to charge more immigration cases.
To give a sense of scope, 2,300 cases were sentenced under the
United States Sentencing Guidelines covering immigration offenses in
1991." Ten years later, the number of sentenced immigration cases had
39
United States General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Committees: INS'
Southwest Border Strategy: Resource and Impact Issues Remain after Seven Years 8 (Aug 2001),

online at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01842.pdf (visited Nov 15, 2009) (noting that the number of active Border Patrol agents grew by more than 200 percent between 1993 and 2000); Ken
Ellingwood, Data on BorderArrests Raise Gatekeeper Debate, LA Times A3 (Oct 1, 1999) (stat-

ing that the Border Patrol's budget grew from $374 million in 1993 to $952 million in 1999).
40

See Joseph Nevins, Operation Gatekeeper:The Rise of the "IllegalAlien" and the Making

of U.S.-Mexico Boundary 90 (Routledge 2002); Alan D. Bersin and Judith S. Feigin, The Rule of
Law at the Margin: Reinventing Prosecution Policy in the Southern District of California, 12

Georgetown Immig L J 285,299-300 (1998).
41
United States General Accounting Office, INS' Southwest Border Strategy at 13 (cited in
note 39).
42
See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (VCCLEA), Pub L No
103-322 § 130001, 108 Stat 1796,2023, codified at 8 USC §1326(b). The Act broadened the application of 8 USC §1326 to include not just aliens with prior felony convictions, but also aliens convicted of three or more misdemeanors "involving drugs, crimes against the person, or both." Id.
43 See Bersin and Feigin, 12 Georgetown Immig L J at 300-01 (cited in note 40) (concluding that the long prison terms prescribed in § 1326(b) encourage defendants arrested for illegal
reentry to agree to fast-track plea agreements).
44 United States Sentencing Commission, Downward Departures Report at 37 (cited in
note 31).
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jumped almost fivefold to 10,457." Immigration cases represented
6.9 percent of all federal criminal sentences in fiscal year 1991, but in ten
years they had grown to account for 17.5 percent of sentences." Of
course, some of this increase was surely due to the efficiency of fast-track
sentencing. In 2001, approximately five thousand cases, comprising
10 percent of the entire federal criminal caseload, were fast-tracked in
Southwest border districts."
Anecdotal evidence suggests that as many as half of the ninetyfour USAOs developed some form of fast-track program. " There is
only one detailed account of a fast-track program from this prePROTECT Act era," but presumably most of the programs operated
along roughly the same lines: a defendant promptly pleads guilty and
waives a number of rights in exchange for a reduced charge or sentence."o The size of the reduction depended on the individual fast-track
program and the discretion of local prosecutors, but it appears that
some of these early fast-track programs offered quite generous bargains to defendants. The Southern District of California's program, for
example, used a dramatic charge-bargaining mechanism -prosecutors
withdrew an illegal reentry charge punishable by up to twenty years in
prison, and replaced it with a charge that had a maximum statutory
penalty of only two years.
The courts were undisturbed by this bold use of prosecutorial discretion. For example, the Ninth Circuit noted in 1995 that fast-track
sentencing "benefits the government and the court system by relieving
court congestion," and it "benefits [illegal reentry] defendants by offering them a substantial sentence reduction."2
Meanwhile, as stated above, Congress repeatedly suggested that
downward departures from the mandatory Guidelines were a cause
45

46

Id.
Id.

47
Vanessa Blum, Ashcroft Memo Endorses Plan for Swift Pleas: New Policy Codifies "FastTrack" Case Processing in Border States, Legal Times 1 (Sept 29, 2003), online at

http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005536751 (visited Oct 9,2009).
48 United States Sentencing Commission, Downward Departures Report at 64 (cited in
note 31).
49
See Bersin and Feigin, 12 Georgetown Immig L J at 300-02 (cited in note 40) (describing the fast-track program initiated in the Southern District of California around 1994).
50 United States Sentencing Commission, Downward Departures Report at 65 (cited in note 31).
51 See Bersin and Feigin, 12 Georgetown Immig L J at 301 (cited in note 40). Most districts
employed charge bargaining in their fast-track programs, though some districts used plea agreements that bound the USAO to recommend an offense-level reduction, or downward departure,
at sentencing. See United States Sentencing Commission, Downward Departures Report at 61, 65
(cited in note 31).
52
United States v Estrada-Plata, 57 F3d 757, 761 (9th Cir 1995).
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for concern in the late 1990s and early 2000s." Under the thenmandatory Guidelines, a sentencing court had limited discretion to
make an upward or downward departure if it found "that there exists
an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of the kind, or to a degree,
not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission." Though many academics and judges thought this rule was too
strict," many in Congress believed that sentencing judges were abusing their discretion by granting too many below-Guidelines sentences
and undermining the mandatory Guidelines.'
The commissioners on the USSC, for their part, explained that
departures, generally speaking, were "an integral part of sentencing
under the guideline system,"" but they also expressed concern that
prosecutorial practices varied significantly from district to district and
that this created geographic disparities.5 These geographic disparities
in downward departures were "likely to be at odds with the [SRA's]
overarching goal of alleviating unwarranted sentencing disparity." A
USSC report documented the disparity clearly: in 2001, the six judicial
districts with the highest downward departure rates accounted for
47.3 percent of all downward departures. Three of these highdeparture districts were along the Southwest border, and a fourth
covered New York City's international airports, suggesting that many

53 See, for example, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight Hearing, 106th Cong, 2d
Sess at 1-2 (cited in note 34) (statement of Sen Thurmond); Subcommittee on Crime Hearing,
104th Cong, 1st Sess at 9 (cited in note 30) (testimony of Judge Conaboy, Chairman, United
States Sentencing Commission) (noting a concern with "a potentially troubling aspect of guideline sentencing, and that's the inconsistent exercise of prosecutorial discretion ... including the
use of substantial assistance departure motions and some charging and plea bargaining practices
that appear to undermine the Sentencing Reform Act goals").
5
18 USC §3553(b)(1).
55 See, for example, Stith and Cabranes, Fear ofJudging at 83 (cited in note 17).
56 Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight Hearing, 106th Cong, 2d Sess at 1 (cited in
note 34) (statement of Sen Thurmond). See also id at 3 (statement of Sen Sessions).
57
Id at 19 (written statement of John R. Steer, Vice Chair, United States Sentencing
Commission).
58
United States Sentencing Commission, Downward DeparturesReport at B-21-22 (cited
in note 31).
59 Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight Hearing, 106th Cong, 2d Sess at 18 n 1 (cited in
note 34) (written statement of John R. Steer, Vice Chair, United States Sentencing Commission).
6
See United States Sentencing Commission, Downward Departures Report at 34-35
(cited in note 31) (noting that two of these districts had consistently high downward departure
rates while the other four varied significantly from year to year). The six districts were Arizona,
New Mexico, the Eastern District of Washington, Connecticut, the Southern District of California, and the Eastern District of New York. The USSC data only accounts for downward departures at sentencing, and not the charge-bargaining agreements used in some districts.
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departures were the product of fast-track programs for immigration
and drug smuggling offenses.
C. The PROTECT Act and § 401(m)(2)(B)
In 2003, Congress authorized a narrow form of fast-track sentenc61
ing in the PROTECT Act, which "was part of a more general effort
by Congress to deal with a perceived increase in the rate of departures
6 The Act, which revised various
from the Sentencing Guidelines."a
criminal statutes, was written in response to a Supreme Court decision
6
the
regarding child pornography. In Ashcroft v Free Speech Coalition,
Supreme Court struck down statutory provisions that criminalized the
possession or distribution of virtual child pornography." In response,
both the House and Senate proposed bills "focusing on the issues of
child pornography, child abduction and child sexual offenses."6'
During this lawmaking, Representative Tom Feeney proposed an
amendment that sharply limited both downward departures and judicial discretion at sentencing." The Feeney Amendment required specific, written reasons for any departure from the Guidelines, and only
permitted downward departures for mitigating factors "identified as a
permissible ground of downward departure in the sentencing guidelines.",6 Offense level reductions for "acceptance of responsibility"
could only be granted upon the government's motion." For the first
time ever, Congress directly amended the Guidelines penalties for
various offenses." And, finally, the Feeney Amendment changed the
standard of review for departures to de novo "to allow appellate
courts to more effectively review illegal and inappropriate downward
departures from federal sentencing guidelines."70

PROTECT Act §401(m)(2)(B), 117 Stat at 675.
United States v Arrelucea-Zamudio,581 F3d 142, 145 (3d Cir 2009).
63
535 US 234 (2002).
6
Id at 256. Virtual child pornography consists of "sexually explicit images that appear to
depict minors but were produced without using any real children." Id at 239.
See United States Sentencing Commission, Downward Departures Report at B-25 (cited
65
in note 31).
66 149 Cong Rec H 2420 (daily ed Mar 27,2003) (statement of Rep Feeney).
67
Id.
68 Providing for Consideration of HR 1104, The Child Abduction Prevention Act of 2003,
HR Rep No 108-48,108th Cong, 1st Sess 3 (2003).
United States Sentencing Commission, Downward DeparturesReport at B-31 (cited in
69
note 31).
70
HR Rep No 108-48 at 3 (cited in note 68); PROTECT Act § 401(d)(2), 117 Stat at 670,
codified at 18 USC § 3742(e).
61
62
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Legislators made floor statements indicating that they supported
the Feeney Amendment due to a continuing concern that sentencing
courts were granting too many downward departures." The Feeney
Amendment passed the House by an overwhelming margin, as did the
full PROTECT Act." In conference, some of the amendment's provisions were moderated." The conference compromise also ordered the
Sentencing Commission to "conduct a thorough study of [downward
departures], develop concrete measures to prevent this abuse, and
report these matters back to Congress."

This section of the final bill, ordering the USSC to study downward departures, also contains the most important part of the Feeney
Amendment for the fast-track disparity debate. Section 401(m)(2)(B)
is a one-sentence provision that gave the USSC 180 days to promulgate "a policy statement authorizing a downward departure of not
more than 4 levels if the Government files a motion for such departure pursuant to an early disposition program authorized by the Attorney General and the United States Attorney."" This section essentially authorized a limited form of fast-track sentencing. It is initially
puzzling that Congress authorized fast-track departures in a bill otherwise devoted to sharply reducing downward departures. But without
fast-track, prosecutors simply could not charge the vast majority of
immigration offenders. A few offenders were sentenced harshly, while
the vast majority were not prosecuted at all." Congress's intent with
this fast-track authorization is not exactly clear, but Congressman
Feeney declared that the authorization of fast-track sentencing in
71 See, for example, 149 Cong Rec at S 5115 (daily ed Apr 10, 2003) (statement of Sen
Hatch); 149 Cong Rec at S 5130 (daily ed Apr 10, 2003) (statement of Sen Sessions); 149 Cong
Rec at H 2421 (daily ed Mar 27,2003) (cited in note 66) (statement of Rep Feeney).
72 149 Cong Rec at H 2436 (daily ed Mar 27, 2003) (cited in note 66) (displaying the roll
call vote on the Feeney Amendment, which passed 357 to 58); 149 Cong Rec at H 2438 (daily ed
Mar 27,2003) (displaying the roll call vote on the PROTECT Act, which passed 410 to 14).
73 Departures in child abduction and child sex offenses were permitted to reward substantial assistance in another prosecution. PROTECT Act § 401(a)(2)(iii), 117 Stat at 667-68. And
while the appellate standard for sentencing decisions was changed to de novo, "factual determinations would continue to be subject to a 'clearly erroneous standard."' United States Sentencing

Commission, Downward DeparturesReport at B-32 (cited in note 31).
74 149 Cong Rec at S 5115 (daily ed Apr 10, 2003) (cited in note 66) (statement of Sen

Hatch).
PROTECT Act § 401(m)(2)(B), 117 Stat at 675.
See United States v Perez-Chavez, 422 F Supp 2d 1255, 1263 (D Utah 2005) ("[Wlhile
fast-track programs do create disparity between prosecuted offenders from district to district;
because they permit more prosecutions, they may prevent the even greater disparity that occurs
when an offender goes unprosecuted because of the lack of prosecutorial resources in a district
with a large volume of immigration offenses.").
75

76
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§ 401(m)(2)(B) was designed to reduce this unwarranted intradistrict
disparity created by resource constraints-a disparity between those
who were charged and those who were not." Congress's goal, again,
was to enforce harsh sentences and reduce disparities.
Through the enactment of this provision, §401(m)(2)(B), Congress
permitted the use of fast-track sentencing if three requirements were
met: (1) the downward departure had to comply with a forthcoming
USSC policy statement, (2) the departure could not be greater than four
levels, and (3) both the Attorney General and local US Attorney had to
authorize the particular fast-track program. Congress had repeatedly
criticized the use of downward deviations, and clearly demanded more
within-Guidelines sentences, but it authorized a restricted form of fasttrack sentencing rather than completely ban the practice.
Consistent with its two overarching goals, Congress restricted
judicial discretion by statute in order to prevent unwarranted disparities and to ensure enforcement of the harsh Guidelines.
D. The Implementation of Fast-Track Programs after the
PROTECT Act
After the PROTECT Act, individual USAOs needed authorization from the Attorney General and a policy statement from the
USSC to implement fast-track sentencing programs. On September
22, 2003, Attorney General John Ashcroft released a memorandum
"set[ting] forth the general criteria that must be satisfied in order to
obtain Attorney General authorization for 'fast-track' programs and
the procedures by which US Attorneys may seek such authorization.""
Ashcroft asserted that fast-track programs are "properly reserved for
exceptional circumstances, such as where the resources of a district
would otherwise be significantly strained by the large volume of a particular category of cases."" However, the memorandum also stated
77 149 Cong Rec at H 2421 (daily ed Mar 27, 2003) (cited in note 66) (statement of Rep
Feeney) (emphasis added):
In order to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities within a given district ...
[a]uthorization for the district to establish an early disposition program ... may be granted
only with respect to those particular classes of offenses (such as illegal reentry) whose high
incidence within the district has imposed an extraordinary strain on the resources of that
district as compared to other districts.
78
John Ashcroft, Memorandum, Department Principles for Implementing an Expedited
Disposition or "Fast-Track" Prosecution Program in a District (Sept 22,2003), reprinted in 21 Fed

Sent Rptr (Vera) 318, 318 (2009) ("DOJ Fast-Track Principles Memorandum"). The Deputy
Attorney General also has the authority to approve fast-track programs. See id at 318 n 1.
79 Id at 318.

2010]

Fast-Track Sentencing Disparity

491

that fast-track sentencing is not to be used to "avoid the ordinary application of the Guidelines to a particular class of cases."' The policy
requires a district to demonstrate certain caseload characteristics-to
justify the necessity of fast-track -before an individual program will
be authorized." And authorization also requires all fast-track programs to contain several consistent procedural elements.
As stated above, § 401(m) of the PROTECT Act also directed the
USSC to promulgate a policy statement authorizing fast-track departures within 180 days," so the Commission held hearings in September
2003 to decide upon the form of the statement.8 Some speakers criticized fast-track programs and suggested that the policy statement add
restrictions beyond those outlined in the Attorney General's memorandum." But the Commission ultimately honored the DOJ's request
80 Id. One of the benefits of downward departures is that they allow judges and prosecutors to show the USSC which Guidelines are unfairly harsh. Ashcroft, though, did not want fasttrack programs to be used in this manner, which is consistent with other directives from his office
constraining the prosecutorial discretion of the USAOs. See Alex Whiting, How Prosecutors
Should Exercise Their Discretion Now that the Sentencing Guidelines Are Advisory, 8 Issues in
Legal Scholarship Iss 2, Art 2, 1, 6-7 (2009), online at http://www.bepress.com/ils/vol8/iss2/art2
(visited Nov 12, 2009) ("To ensure that the Guidelines achieved their goal of sentencing uniformity, the Department required prosecutors to charge defendants according to a consistent formula (the most serious provable offense), to pursue plea-bargains reflecting those charges, and
to apply the Guidelines faithfully.").
81 First, the district must either be facing "an exceptionally large number of a specific class
of offense" that would "significantly strain prosecutorial and judicial resources," or be facing
"some other exceptional local circumstance with respect to a specific class of cases that justifies
expedited disposition." DOJ Fast-Track Principles Memorandum, 21 Fed Sent Rptr (Vera) at 319
(cited in note 78). Second, the cases in question must be "highly repetitive and present substantially similar fact scenarios." Id. Third, it must be impossible or inappropriate to turn the cases
over to state prosecution. Id. Fourth, the fast-tracked offense must not have been designated as a
"crime of violence." Id.
8
First, the defendant must promptly plead guilty. DOJ Fast-Track Principles Memorandum, 21 Fed Sent Rptr (Vera) at 319. Second, the plea agreement must be written, and it must
include an accurate factual description of the offense conduct, an agreement not to file pretrial
motions under FRCrP 12(b)(3), and waiver of the right to appeal or challenge the conviction
under the habeas corpus statute. Id at 320. The defendant does not waive the right to make a
habeas claim regarding "ineffective assistance of counsel." Id. Third, in exchange for the defendant's plea and waiver of rights, the prosecutor may move at sentencing for a downward departure "of a specific number of levels, not to exceed 4 levels." Id.
8
PROTECT Act § 401(m)(2),117 Stat at 675.
8
See generally Implementing Requirements of the PROTECT Act, Public Hearing before the United States Sentencing Commission (Sept 23, 2003) ("USSC Hearing"), online at
http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/9 23_03/092303PH.pdf (visited Nov 12,2009).
85 See, for example, Frank 0. Bowman, III, Only Suckers Pay the Sticker Price:The Effect of
"Fast Track" Programs on the Future of the Sentencing Guidelines as a Principled Sentencing
System 9, online at http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/9_- 23_-03/fbowman.pdf (visited Nov 12, 2009)
(written statement for the USSC Hearing, cited in note 84). Professor Bowman alternately suggested that if the Sentencing Commission wanted to encourage prosecutors to flag bad guide-
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for an "unfettered"" policy statement and promulgated USSG
§ 5K3.1," which is nearly identical to § 401(m)(2)(b).
DOJ authorized the first fast-track programs a month after the
release of Ashcroft's "Department Principles" memo." It has since
issued new authorizations on roughly an annual schedule. In DOJ's
most recent authorization memo, Deputy Attorney General David W.
Ogden approved twenty-nine fast-track programs in seventeen judicial districts." All of the programs are for immigration-related crimes
or cross-border drug smuggling offenses."
Because of fast-track's efficiency, prosecutors are now able to
charge and sentence many more offenders. Those sentences are shorter, but aggregate punishment is significantly harsher because of the
many additional defendants prosecuted. For example, prior to fasttrack, in 1992, there were over 500,000 apprehensions for illegal immigration in Southern California, but the local USAO only brought 245
felony cases.9' Logistical restraints, not prosecutorial discretion, dictated the decision to charge only this tiny fraction of offenders.9" In
2007, using fast-track sentencing, the USAO in the Southern District
of California brought 2,062 felony immigration cases." The average
sentence was shorter, but fast-track can hardly be considered lenient.
With fast-track, prosecutors increased the number of sentenced oflines by downwardly departing from them, it should grant "the widest possible leeway" to the
Justice Department. Id.
86 United States Sentencing Commission, Downward Departures Report at 66 (cited in
note 31).
8
USSG Appendix C, Amend 651 (creating USSG § 5K3.1).
88 The first authorization came on October 24, 2003. See James M. Comey, Memorandum,
Authorization of Early Disposition Programs(Oct 29, 2004), reprinted in 21 Fed Sent Rptr (Ve-

ra) 322,323 (2009).
89 David W. Ogden, Memorandum, Authorization for Early DispositionPrograms (Mar 31,
2009), reprinted in 21 Fed Sent Rptr (Vera) 335,335-36 (2009).
90 Id. Two of the twenty-nine approved programs were for aggravated identity theft-a
charge often used by USAOs against illegal immigrants with forged documents. Government
filings from 2005 show that fast-track programs vary significantly from one another, but the
implications of those differences are beyond the scope of this Comment. For example, some
districts give different bargains to defendants depending on their individual criminal histories.
See Government's Supplemental Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for a NonGuideline Sentence based on Fast-Track Programs: Fast-Track Dispositions District-by-District
Relating to Illegal Reentry Cases, United States v Medrano-Duran,No 04-cr-884, *22-31 (Appendix A) (ND Ill filed Aug 3,2005), reprinted in 21 Fed Sent Rptr (Vera) 339,339-48 (2009).
91 William Braniff, Local Discretion,ProsecutorialChoices and the Sentencing Guidelines,5

Fed Sent Rptr (Vera) 309,309 (1993).
9
Id (noting that prosecuting all illegal immigrants would have overwhelmed the local
court system as well as the entire federal prison system).
9
Author's analysis of Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Justice Statistics Resource
Center, online at http://fjsrc.urban.org (visited Nov 15,2009).
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fenders by a factor of seven. Even with shorter average sentences, the
cumulative punishment increased substantially. And since fewer offenders were escaping prosecution, the gross intradistrict disparity
cited by Congress" was significantly reduced. This likely has a significant deterrent effect because offenders are more deterred by certainty
of punishment than by severity of punishment." Thus, Congress's fasttrack authorization also served its two consistent sentencing objectives. Fast-track sentencing increased the aggregate harshness of sentences and severely reduced intradistrict disparities between charged
and uncharged offenders.
II. RECENT SUPREME COURT RULINGS ON
SENTENCING DISCRETION

As stated in Part I, under the sentencing regime created by the
SRA, judges only had limited power to depart from the Guidelines
under § 3553(b).' Congress further limited that judicial discretion with
the PROTECT Act." However, several Supreme Court decisions in
the last decade have expanded sentencing court discretion and made
the Guidelines advisory. It is important to understand what the Court
has held, since these decisions have undone much of the sentencing
system that was in place when Congress initially authorized fast-track
sentencing.
A. Advisory Sentencing Guidelines
In 2005, the Supreme Court declared that the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutional in United States v Booker."
Specifically, the Court held that the Guidelines violated the Sixth
Amendment's jury trial right because they allowed a sentencing judge
to find facts, without a jury, that could raise a defendant's maximum
statutory sentence.99 Booker cleaved the Court into two factions, resulting in two separate 5-4 opinions: a merits opinion holding the

See notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
See Michael K. Block, Commentary: Emerging Problems in the Sentencing Commission's
Approach to Guideline Amendments, 1 Fed Sent Rptr (Vera) 451, 451 (1989) (noting that "deterrence research indicates that an increase in the certainty of punishment is a more powerful method
of dissuading potential offenders than an equivalent increase in the magnitude of punishment").
9
See Part I.A.
9
See Part I.C.
9
543 US 220 (2005).
9 Id at 226-27,243-44.
9

9

The University of Chicago Law Review

494

[77:479

Guidelines unconstitutional,"' and a remedial opinion resolving the
constitutional problem.'0 ' In the remedial opinion, the Court's constitutional solution was to hold that the Guidelines were no longer mandatory.'O The Court excised the mandatory portions of the SRA, leaving
the Guidelines "effectively advisory."' A sentencing court has to "take
account of' the appropriate Guidelines range,'" but it can "tailor the
sentence in light of other statutory concerns as well, see § 3553(a)."'O'
Title 18 USC § 3553(a) is the federal statute that "guide[s] sentencing,"',' and it is critical to the fast-track debate. At sentencing, a
district court judge is required by §3553(a) to consult a set list of
"Factors To Be Considered in Imposing a Sentence.". When the
Guidelines were mandatory, sentencing judges rarely needed to rigorously work through these factors because the SRA usually bound
courts to a narrow and mandatory Guidelines range. After Booker,
§ 3553(a) became the lodestar for all sentencing decisions. District
courts are now required to carefully weigh the § 3553(a) factors in
crafting an appropriate sentence.
The first clause of the statute, sometimes called the "parsimony
clause,"'" states "[t]he court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not
greater than necessary"'"9 to accomplish the traditional sentencing
goals of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation."o
Section 3553(a) also requires the court to consider "the kinds of sentences available," the sentencing range, and any pertinent policy
statements from the USSC.'" Most importantly for the fast-track debate, § 3553(a)(6) states that the court must consider "the need to
avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.,,12 This is the

100 Id at 225-44.
101 Id at 244-71.
102
103
104
105

Booker, 543 US at 245.
Id.
Id at 259.
Id at 245.

106 Booker, 543 US at 261.

10

18 USC § 3553(a).
The utilitarian "parsimony principle," proposed by Jeremy Bentham, holds that any punishment that does not serve its end is unjust. Jeremy Bentham, The Rationale of Punishment 23 (R.
Heward 1830) ("All punishment being in itself evil, upon the principle of utility, if it ought at all to
be admitted, it ought only to be admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some greater evil.").
109 18 USC § 3553(a).
110 18 USC § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D).
1'1 18 USC § 3553(a)(3)-(5).
112 18 USC § 3553(a)(6).
108
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clause that defendants in non-fast-track jurisdictions cite when requesting a below-Guidelines sentence to mitigate the fast-track disparity.
B.

Deferential Standard of Review

The remedial opinion in Booker also excised 18 USC § 3742(e),"3
the Feeney Amendment's requirement that sentencing decisions must
be reviewed de novo. In place of de novo review, the Booker Court
held that appellate courts should review sentencing decisions under a
deferential reasonableness standard."4 The Court noted that the
PROTECT Act's justification for adding de novo review was "to make
Guidelines sentencing even more mandatory than it had been," but
that this "ceased to be relevant" with advisory Guidelines."'
Appellate courts apparently misunderstood the Court's directive
to review sentencing decisions for unreasonableness, because the
Court chose to decide three cases on the issue in the next two years. In
these cases, the Court repeatedly and consistently held that the circuits are to deferentially review the discretion of sentencing courts.
For example, in Gall v United States,"' the Supreme Court held
that appellate courts must review sentencing decisions under an
"abuse-of-discretion" standard, regardless of whether a sentence is
outside the defendant's Guidelines range.' Appellate courts may not
demand "extraordinary circumstances" for sentences substantially
outside of the Guidelines range, because that is too close to a presumption that non-Guidelines sentences are unreasonable."' Gall also
contained detailed instructions for how a district court is to make sentencing decisions. First, the court must "correctly calculat[e] the applicable Guidelines range" as a "starting point and the initial benchmark.".. Second, the court must consider arguments from the parties
as to the appropriate sentence.' Third, the district court must "consider all of the § 3553(a) factors to determine whether they support the
sentence requested by a party."1 If the court determines that an "out21

Booker, 543 US at 260.
Id at 261.
115 Id.
116 552 US 38 (2007).
117 Id at 41.
118 Id at 47.
119 Id at 49 (arguing that this requirement was necessary "[a]s a matter of administration
and to secure nationwide consistency").
120 Gall, 552 US at 49-50.
121 Id.
113
114
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side-Guidelines" sentence is warranted, the court must justify the variance."' Again, § 3553(a) is the lodestar for sentencing decisions.
In Rita v United States,' the Court held that it was permissible for
an appellate court to presume that a within-Guidelines sentence was
reasonable,' so long as the presumption is not binding. 2' The Court
noted that a "Guidelines sentence will usually be reasonable, because
it reflects both the Commission's and the sentencing court's judgment
as to what is an appropriate sentence for a given offender."' However, the sentencing court may not presume a Guidelines sentence is reasonable." The lower court must fairly consider "arguments by prosecution or defense that the Guidelines sentence should not apply.""
While Gall and Rita are important, this Comment focuses in particular
on Kimbrough v United States, since that decision triggered the current fast-track debate.
C.

Kimbrough: Courts May Issue Below-Guidelines Sentences for
Policy Reasons

The question in Kimbrough was whether a sentence "outside the
guidelines range is per se unreasonable when it is based on a disagreement with the sentencing disparity for crack and powder cocaine
offenses.""9 The Court held that such a below-Guidelines sentence is
not unreasonable, because lower courts have broad discretion to ensure that sentences abide by § 3553(a)'s parsimony principle.'

At Derrick Kimbrough's sentencing hearing, the district court
judge gave him a below-Guidelines sentence. The judge believed that
applying the Guidelines for crack cocaine offenses would be a violation of the parsimony clause's requirement that sentences be "sufficient but not greater than necessary" to achieve the purposes of sentencing."' At the time, the Guidelines for crack cocaine offenses were
significantly higher than for similar offenses involving powder cocaine.
122 Id at 50 (noting that major departures should be supported by more significant justifications than minor ones).
123 551 US 338 (2007).
124 Id at 347.
125 Id.
126 Id at 351.
12 Rita, 551 US at 351.
128 Id (emphasis added) (suggesting that such arguments may establish that the case at hand
falls outside of the "heartland" of cases to which the Guidelines are meant to apply or that "the
Guidelines sentence itself fails properly to reflect § 3553(a) considerations").
129 Kimbrough, 552 US at 91.
130 Id at 110.
131 Id at 92-93.
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The sentencing judge disagreed with this disparity on policy grounds,
so he imposed the statutory minimum sentence, which was below the

defendant's Guidelines range.132
While the USSC usually develops Guidelines ranges through "an
empirical approach based on data about past sentencing practices,
including 10,000 presentence investigation reports,"'3 the Kimbrough
Court found that "[tlhe Commission did not use this empirical approach in developing the Guidelines sentences for drug-trafficking
offenses."'" Instead, it modeled its Guidelines for crack and powder
cocaine on Congress's Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which contained
significantly higher statutory minima and maxima for crack cocaine
offenses than powder cocaine offenses."' Years later the Commission
"determined that the crack/powder sentencing disparity is generally
unwarranted."'3 It then attempted to reduce the disparity, but Congress rejected the Commission's attempts to amend the Guidelines."
Booker made the Guidelines advisory, so the question in Kimbrough was whether the crack-powder disparity was "an exception to
the 'general freedom that sentencing courts have to apply the
[§ 3553(a)] factors.'"'m The government argued that while Congress did
not "expressly direct"39 the Sentencing Commission to adopt the disparity, it did so implicitly both when it created a crack-powder disparity in the statutory minima and maxima of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act,
and when it rejected the Commission's amendments to the Guidelines.'O In other words, the government conceded that sentencing
courts have broad discretion to disagree with Guidelines policy,"' but
argued that courts lack the discretion to grant a below-Guidelines
sentence if it would undermine an implicit congressional policy. The
Court rejected this argument and held that Congress must be explicit
132

Id at 93.

133

Kimbrough, 552 US at 96.

Id.
Id at 97 ("[T]he Commission, in line with the 1986 Act, adopted the 100-to-1 ratio.").
See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub L No 99-570 §1002, 100 Stat 3207,3207-1-3207-3, codified
at 21 USC § 841(b)(1) (mandating the same minimum sentence for distributing five hundred
grams of powder cocaine as for distributing five grams of crack, thus establishing the infamous
100-to-1 ratio).
136 Kimbrough, 552 US at 97.
137 Id at 99.
138 Id at 102 (citation omitted).
139 Brief for the United States, Kimbrough v United States, No 06-6330, *33 (US filed
Aug 30,2007) (available on Westlaw at 2007 WL 2461473) (quotation marks omitted).
140 Id at *31-42.
141 See id at *16.
134

135
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if it intends to cabin judicial discretion in this fashion. The Court noted
that the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 created statutory minimum and
maximum sentences, but was absolutely silent as to "appropriate sentences within these brackets."42 The Court "decline[d] to read any implicit directive into that congressional silence."14 Arguably this created
something akin to a clear statement rule: Congress must speak unambiguously and explicitly if it means to limit judicial sentencing discretion.
Also, the Court declined to grant the usual deference to the
USSC's crack Guidelines because the USSC did not fulfill its usual
institutional role. The Court noted that the Sentencing Commission
"fills an important institutional role"M and that, "in the ordinary case,
the Commission's recommendation of a sentencing range will 'reflect
a rough approximation of sentences that might achieve § 3553(a)'s
objectives."" 4 The sentencing judge, on the other hand, has a better
understanding of the particular case before him.'46 So when a judge
determines that a case is "outside the heartland," the sentencing
court's decision to vary from the Guidelines is to be given "greatest
respect."47 But "in a mine-run case," "closer review" by the appellate
court may be necessary when the sentencing court varies based on a
disagreement with the Guidelines.' Yet the Court argued that this
principle did not apply in Kimbrough because the crack-powder
"Guidelines do not exemplify the Commission's exercise of its characteristic institutional role."'4 Because the Commission merely followed
Congress's cues from the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act, and because the
Commission later decided that the crack-powder disparity was unwarranted, the crack cocaine Guidelines apparently did not deserve the
. *
150
''greatest respect," even in a mine-run
case.
In Kimbrough, the Supreme Court powerfully reasserted that
sentencing courts have broad discretion to determine an appropriate
sentence under § 3553(a). The Court found that this sentencing discretion remains even when a contrary sentence is implicitly endorsed by
Congress, and explicitly endorsed by the Guidelines. In addition, Kimbrough gave lower courts a post-Booker look at what the Supreme
142
143
144
145
146
147

Kimbrough, 552 US at 103.
Id.
Id at 108-09.
Id at 109, quoting Rita, 551 US at 350.
Kimbrough, 552 US at 109.
Id.

148 Id.
149

Id.
150 Kimbrough, 552 US at 110.
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Court would consider an "unwarranted disparity" under § 3553(a)(6).
Although Kimbrough did not discuss fast-track programs, its emphasis
on sentencing court discretion and hints as to the meaning of unwarranted disparity opened the door for circuit courts to reassess their
fast-track precedent.
III. THE FAST-TRACK CIRCUIT SPLIT
Defendants in non-fast-track jurisdictions claim that the sentence
disparity between fast-track and non-fast-track districts is "unwarranted" under § 3553(a)(6), which requires sentencing courts to consider "the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
conduct."' These defendants argue that sentencing courts have the
discretion to mitigate the disparity by imposing below-Guidelines sentences. Every circuit court to hear this argument prior to 2007 determined that the disparity was not "unwarranted" because "Congress
implicitly determined that the disparity was warranted" when it authorized fast-track programs in the PROTECT Act." However, the
Supreme Court's decision in Kimbrough has caused five circuits to
reassess their precedent on this issue.
A. The Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits: Courts May Not Mitigate
the Fast-Track Disparity
In United States v Gomez-Herrera,"' the Fifth Circuit reassessed

the fast-track disparity question and held that Kimbrough did not undermine its precedent holding that sentencing courts may not mitigate
the disparity at sentencing.m The defendant in the underlying case,
Pedro Gomez-Herrera, pled guilty to illegal reentry following removal,

151 18 USC § 3553(a)(6).
152 United States v Castro, 455 F3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir 2006) (arguing that Congress's
PROTECT Act authorization of fast-track departures only in fast-track districts was an implicit
determination that the disparity was warranted). For similar holdings from other circuits, see
United States v Anddjar-Arias,507 F3d 734,742 (1st Cir 2007); United States v Mejia, 461 F3d 158,
163 (2d Cir 2006); United States v Vargas, 477 F3d 94,98-100 (3d Cir 2007); United States v PerezPena, 453 F3d 236, 243 (4th Cir 2006); United States v Aguirre-Villa, 460 F3d 681, 683 (5th Cir
2006); United States v Hernandez-Fierros,453 F3d 309, 314 (6th Cir 2006); United States v Martinez-Martinez, 442 F3d 539,542 (7th Cir 2006); United States v Sebastian,436 F3d 913,916 (8th Cir
2006); United States v Marcial-Santiago,447 F3d 715,718 (9th Cir 2006); United States v MartinezTrujillo,468 F3d 1266, 1268 (10th Cir 2006).
153 523 F3d 554 (5th Cir 2008).
154 Id at 559.
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and argued at sentencing for a below-Guidelines sentence."' One of his
justifications was the fast-track disparity.' Gomez-Herrera argued that
Kimbrough had overruled the Fifth Circuit's precedent on the fast-track
disparity issue.' The Fifth Circuit, however, held that "Kimbrough,
which concerned a district court's ability to sentence in disagreement
with Guideline policy, does not control this case, which concerns a district
court's ability to sentence in disagreement with Congressionalpolicy.""
First, the court reasoned that the text of the PROTECT Act's
fast-track authorization "plainly limits fast-track departures to early
disposition programs authorized by the Attorney General."... Letting
defendants in other jurisdictions obtain the "same benefits" as fasttrack defendants would undermine the prosecutor's discretionary decision to offer fast-track benefits only when justified by the "economies" of early disposition.'" Second, the court reasoned that the fasttrack disparity is "not 'unwarranted' within the meaning of
§ 3553(a)(6)" because the disparity was "intended by Congress."... According to the Fifth Circuit, "the disparity was specifically authorized
by Congress in the PROTECT Act."6' Oddly, though, the court cited
pre-Kimbrough precedent describing the authorization as "implicit"
or "necessary," not "explicit."'" The court asserted that Kimbrough
was limited to sentencing decisions that contradicted USSC policy,
and argued that the fast-track disparity instead turned on congressional policy because Congress had mandated the disparity in the
PROTECT Act. For the Fifth Circuit then, Kimbrough did not undermine the circuit's precedent holding that a fast-track sentencing disparity
is not unwarranted under § 3553(a)(6).'" The court's conclusion rested
Id at 556.
Id at 556-57.
157 Gomez-Herrera,523 F3d at 559.
158 Id (emphasis added).
159 Id at 561.
160 Id.
161 Gomez-Herrera,523 F3d at 562.
162 Id at 562, quoting Martinez-Trujillo,468 F3d at 1268.
163 Gomez-Herrera, 523 F3d at 562-63, citing Castro, 455 F3d at 1252 ("Congress implicitly
determined that the disparity was warranted.") (emphasis added); Mejia,461 F3d at 163 ("Congress expressly approved of fast-track programs without mandating them; Congress thus necessarily decided that they do not create the unwarranted sentencing disparities that it prohibited in
Section 3553(a)(6).") (emphasis added); Aguirre-Villa, 460 F3d at 683 ("Congress must have
thought the disparity warranted when it authorized early disposition programs without altering
§ 3553(a)(6).") (emphasis added).
164 The court also noted that Gomez-Herrera may not be "similarly situated" to fast-track
defendants because he did not offer to sign the waiver of rights typically demanded by fast-track
programs. Gomez-Herrera,523 F3d at 563.
155

156
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heavily on its interpretation of the PROTECT Act's fast-track authorization as an explicit warrant of the fast-track disparity.
The Eleventh Circuit reassessed the fast-track disparity question
in United States v Vega-Castillo,'" but ultimately held that it was una-

ble to overturn its prior precedent on the issue.'66The defendant in the
underlying case, Victor Gonzalo Vega-Castillo, pled guilty to illegal
reentry after removal. Vega-Castillo then asked the district court to
grant a below-Guidelines sentence to mitigate the fast-track disparity.
The district court refused his request and imposed a sentence at the low
end of his Guidelines range.'6 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit panel's
majority held that the circuit's prior precedent rule prevented it from
overturning previous decisions on the fast-track disparity issue.'6 The
majority interpreted the rule as requiring the panel to "follow a prior
binding precedent unless and until it is overruled by this court en banc
or by the Supreme Court."" It was not enough for the Supreme Court
to overrule the "reasoning that supports that holding."1'
The court went on, though, to distinguish Kimbrough from its
precedent on the fast-track sentencing disparity. The first distinction
was formalistic: Kimbrough dealt with a court's ability to consider a
disparity created by the crack-powder cocaine Guidelines, whereas the
fast-track disparity comes under a different Guideline.' The second
distinction was between a court's discretion to disagree with Guideline
policy, and its discretion to disagree with congressional policy."' The

540 F3d 1235 (11th Cir 2008).
Id at 1238-39.
167 Id at 1236. The opinion indicates that Vega-Castillo proposed that sentencing courts
must consider fast-track disparity at sentencing, rather than that they may consider the disparity.
See id at 1236. The Eleventh Circuit had prior precedent holding that a sentencing court is not
required to consider fast-track disparity, Castro, 455 F3d at 1253, and that it may not consider
165
166

such disparity. See United States v Llanos-Agostadero,486 F3d 1194, 1199 (11th Cir 2007); United

States v Arevalo-Juarez,464 F3d 1246, 1251 (11th Cir 2006). The defendant's conflation of the
must question is not problematic because the court decided the broader may question.
168 Vega-Castillo, 540 F3d at 1236.
169 Id at 1236-39. The court later denied Vega-Castillo's petition for an en banc rehearing.
Vega-Castillo,548 F3d 980 (2008). Judge Edward Carnes filed a concurrence to the denial, stating
that he agreed with the panel's majority opinion but that a "fresh look en banc" was appropriate
if a future case raised the question more cleanly. Id at 981-82 (Carnes concurring). Judge Carnes
argued that Vega-Castillo's extended criminal history made him ineligible for fast-track even in a
fast-track district, see note 90, and that Vega-Castillo's case was a bad vehicle for rehearing
because he had not signed the waiver of rights demanded of fast-track recipients. 548 F3d at 982.
170 Vega-Castillo, 540 F3d at 1236 (quotation marks omitted).
171 Id at 1237.
172 Id at 1239.
173 Id.
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majority cited Gomez-Herrera approvingly on this point,' and suggested that the fast-track disparity was not unwarranted under
§ 3553(a)(6) because "Congress implicitly determined that the disparity
was warranted.".. The Eleventh Circuit then, like the Fifth Circuit, interpreted the fast-track authorization in the PROTECT Act as warranting
the fast-track disparity. The third distinction was that Kimbrough "dealt
only with [ ] Guidelines [ ] that, like the crack cocaine Guidelines, 'do not
exemplify the Commission's exercise of its characteristic institutional
role.""'7 The implication was that the USSC's promulgation of the fasttrack policy statement was a proper example of its "institutional role."
Judge Rosemary Barkett dissented passionately from the majority's
opinion.'" She explained that "Kimbrough has completely undermined
the rationale of [ ] prior cases" and that the majority had exaggerated the
stickiness of the circuit's prior precedent rule.'" She further argued that a
circuit panel must reverse precedent "when an intervening Supreme
Court decision has 'undermined [a prior panel decision] to the point of
abrogation.""' Judge Barkett also reasoned that the "implicit" congressional authorization of the crack-powder disparity in Kimbrough was
comparable to the PROTECT Act's implicit authorization of a fast-track
disparity." Since the Supreme Court had held in Kimbrough that an
implicit authorization was insufficient to cabin judicial discretion,"' she
argued that the Court had abrogated the circuit's precedent. Her fundamental disagreement with the majority opinion, then, was in how she
interpreted the fast-track authorization in the PROTECT Act.
Judge Barkett also remarked that the Supreme Court had "made
consideration of the § 3553(a) factors paramount, including a determination that in a particular case, a within-Guidelines sentence may
be 'greater than necessary' to serve the objectives of sentencing."...
Finally, Judge Barkett described how the Supreme Court's opinions in
Kimbrough, Rita, and Gall showed that sentencing courts must "take
Vega-Castillo,540 F3d at 1239, citing Gomez-Herrera,523 F3d at 563.
The Eleventh Circuit found Congress's warrant to be implicit, but the Fifth Circuit had
earlier described Congress's warrant of the fast-track disparity as explicit. Contrast Vega-Castillo,
540 F3d at 1238, quoting Castro, 455 F3d at 1252, with notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
176 Vega-Castillo, 540 F3d at 1239, quoting Kimbrough, 552 US at 109.
177 Vega-Castillo, 540 F3d at 1239 (Barkett dissenting).
178 Id at 1239. Judge Barkett also argued that the majority had misinterpreted the First
Circuit's prior precedent rule. See id at 1241 n 5.
179 Id at 1239 ("I believe it to be beyond peradventure that Kimbrough has completely
undermined that rationale of our prior cases .....
1so Id at 1240.
181 Id, citing Kimbrough, 552 US at 103.
182 Vega-Castillo, 540 F3d at 1240 (Barkett dissenting).
174
175
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account of sentencing practices in other courts,,,m and that they "may

consider arguments that 'the Guidelines sentence itself fails properly
to reflect § 3553(a) considerations.""'
The Ninth Circuit reassessed its precedent on the fast-track disparity issue in United States v Gonzalez-Zotelo,m' holding that Kim-

brough did not undermine the circuit's prior precedent forbidding the
consideration of the fast-track disparity at sentencing.'" The defendant, Juan Gonzalez-Zotelo, was convicted of illegal reentry and faced a
Guidelines sentence of sixty-three to seventy-eight months.m GonzalezZotelo was prosecuted in a fast-track district, but the USAO did not
offer him a fast-track plea because of his prior "conviction for lewd or
lascivious acts with a child under the age of 14."' At sentencing, the
district court judge imposed a below-Guidelines sentence due to a "lack
of 'consistency"' between Gonzalez-Zotelo and a defendant who had
received a thirty month fast-track sentence earlier that same day."
The Ninth Circuit summed up the case's key issue as "whether we
are still bound to follow the reasoning of [our precedent] in light of
Kimbrough."'" The court described its prior precedent rule as requiring a subsequent panel to follow prior precedent "unless a subsequent
decision by a relevant court of last resort either effectively overrules the
decision in a case closely on point or undercuts the reasoning underlying the circuit precedent rendering the cases clearly irreconcilable."'.
The court held that "Kimbrough did not effectively overrule[] or undercut[] the reasoning of [its precedent] so that the two cases are clearly
irreconcilable."" Like the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, the Ninth Circuit
noted that Kimbrough was distinguishable because it concerned a policy disagreement with Guidelines policy, not congressional policy.' The
court reasoned that since Congress had authorized fast-track sentencing
"without revising the terms of § 3553(a)(6), Congress was necessarily
providing that the sentencing disparities that result from these proId at 1241, citing Kimbrough, 552 US at 108.
Vega-Castillo,540 F3d at 1241 (Barkett dissenting), citing Kimbrough, 552 US at 101-02
and quoting Rita, 551 US at 351.
185 556 F3d 736 (9th Cir 2009).
186 Id at 740.
187 Gonzalez-Zotelo, 556 F3d at 738.
188 Id. Individual USAOs have different fast-track protocols, some of which exclude certain
types of offenders from their programs. See note 90.
189 Id.
190 Id at 740.
191Gonzalez-Zotelo, 556 F3d at 740 (quotation marks omitted).
192 Id (quotation marks omitted).
193 Id.
183

184
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grams are warranted."'m Like the other circuits, the Ninth Circuit's decision depended heavily on reading the PROTECT Act as an explicit (or
implicit) warrant of the fast-track disparity.
B.

The First and Third Circuits: Courts May Mitigate the Fast-Track
Disparity

The First Circuit also had precedent holding that the fast-track disparity was "not 'unwarranted' within the meaning of section 3553(a)(6)
and that, therefore, any such disparity 'may not be considered by a district judge in sentencing as a basis for a variance."". However, in contrast to the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, the First Circuit held in
United States v Rodriguez'" that Kimbrough and Gall had "under-

mine[dJ the interpretive approach" of its precedent.'" The court rejected
its prior precedent and held that "sentencing courts can consider items
such as fast-track disparity" when sentencing.. The defendant, Yonothan Rodriguez, pleaded guilty to one count of illegal reentry following removal.'" Rodriguez then argued for a below-Guidelines sentence
based, in part, on the "unacceptable disparity" created by the district's
lack of a fast-track program." The court noted that he based this argument "not only on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), but also on section 3553(a)'s
overarching [parsimony] provision and sentencing goals." 1
The court began its analysis by reviewing Gall and Kimbrough,
noting that "under an advisory guidelines regime," those decisions
"emphasiz[ed] the breadth of a district court's discretion to deviate
from a defendant's [Guidelines range] based on the compendium of
sentencing factors mentioned in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)."m Sentencing
courts are in a "superior coign of vantage" to find facts and determine
their application under § 3553(a)'s sentencing factors.203 The court
found Kimbrough particularly relevant due to its holding that sentencing courts may justify below-Guidelines sentences on policy consider-

Id, quoting Marcial-Santiago, 447 F3d at 718.
United States v Rodriguez, 527 F3d 221, 224 (1st Cir 2008), quoting Anddjar-Arias, 507
F3d at 739.
196 527 F3d 221 (1st Cir 2008).
19 Id at 222.
198 Id at 231.
199 Id at 222-23.
200 Rodriguez, 527 F3d at 223.
19

195

201

Id.

202

Id at 225, citing Gall, 552 US at 49-50, and Kimbrough,552 US at 101, 110-11.
Rodriguez, 527 F3d at 227.

203
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ations." Additionally, the court drew attention to the Supreme Court's
refusal in Kimbrough to "read any implicit directive into ... congres-

sional silence."2
The court then recognized several arguments for overturning its
precedent on fast-track disparity. First, the court emphasized that
"[1]ike the crack/powder ratio, fast-track departure authority has been
both blessed by Congress and openly criticized by the [USSC].",O,
Therefore, the fast-track programs do not "exemplify the [Sentencing]
Commission's exercise of its characteristic institutional role."m The
court read Kimbrough to hold that the Guidelines deserve less deference when they are not the product of the Commission's rigorous,
scientific procedure."
Next the court noted that in its "pre-Kimbrough" decisions it had
asked the "isthmian question" of whether fast-track disparity could be
considered under § 3553(a)(6).2 But Kimbrough's "organic reading of
section 3553(a) suggests that a sentencing judge should engage in a
more holistic inquiry."210 The sentencing statute is "more than a laundry list of discrete sentencing factors; it is, rather, a tapestry of factors,
through which runs the thread of an overarching principle."21 1 The
court identified this "parsimony principle"212 in § 3553(a)'s broad directive that district courts should "impose a sentence sufficient, but
not greater than necessary," to achieve the goals of sentencing.213 "This
inquiry should be guided by, but not made unflinchingly subservient
to, the concerns expressed in the statute's various sub-parts.21herefore, a sentencing court should not reject an argument for a belowGuidelines sentence until it has considered how the alleged disparity
is implicated by the "constellation" of sentencing factors." The court
held that "even if a specific sentencing rationale cannot be considered

207

Id at 225-26.
Id at 226, quoting Kimbrough, 552 US at 103.
Rodriguez, 527 F3d at 227.
Id, quoting Kimbrough, 552 US at 109.

208

Rodriguez, 527 F3d at 227. Consider Comment, Deviations Based on Policy Disagree-

204
205
206

ments, 122 Harv L Rev 326, 331-36 (2008) (arguing that Kimbrough showcased an "indeterminate" view of when sentencing courts can diverge from the Guidelines, meaning some Guidelines
deserve less deference than others).
2
Rodriguez, 527 F3d at 227-28.
210 Id at 228.
211 Id, citing Kimbrough, 552 US at 101.
212 Rodriguez, 527 F3d at 228.
213 Id, quoting Kimbrough, 552 US at 101 and 18 USC § 3553(a).
214 Rodriguez, 527 F3d at 228.
215 Id.
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under the aegis of a particular sub-part" of § 3553(a), such a bar does
not prevent its consideration under "the full panoply" of § 3553(a).2 M
Ultimately, the court held that Kimbrough opened the door for
judges to consider fast-track sentencing disparities "within the overall
ambit of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)."217 The First Circuit reasoned that the
fast-track authorization in §401(m)(2)(B) of the PROTECT Act was
not a bar. "While the Kimbrough Court acknowledged that a sentencing court can be constrained by express congressional directives, such
as statutory mandatory maximum and minimum prison terms, the
PROTECT

Act ... contains

no such

express

directive."...

Sec-

tion 401(m)(2)(B) "authorizes the Sentencing Commission to issue a
policy statement," but it says nothing about how courts must sentence
or whether they may "deviate from the guidelines based on fast-track
disparity."... "Kimbrough made pellucid that when Congress exercises
its power to bar district courts from using a particular sentencing rationale, it does so by the use of unequivocal terminology."20 Essentially, the First Circuit held in Rodriguez that lower courts may consider
fast-track disparities when imposing sentences unless Congress unambiguously bars them from doing so, and it did not read such a statutory
bar in § 401(m)(2)(B) of the PROTECT Act."
The Third Circuit jumped into the circuit split in United States v
Arrelucea-Zamudio,2 where the court "clarif[ied]" its precedent and
held that "under the logic of Kimbrough, it is within a sentencing
judge's discretion to consider a variance from the Guidelines on the
basis of a fast-track disparity.'" The defendant, Pedro Manuel Arrelucea-Zamudio, like the defendants in the other circuits' decisions, pled
guilty to illegal reentry and requested a below-Guidelines sentence
based on the fast-track disparity. The district court rejected his request due to the Circuit's pre-Kimbrough precedent,m and Mr. Arrelucea-Zamudio appealed.

216
217
218
219

Id at 229.
Id.
Rodriguez, 527 F3d at 229 (citation omitted).
Id.

Id at 230.
Id at 229.
222 581 F3d 142 (3d Cir 2009).
223 Id at 143.
224 Id at 143-44.
225 Id at 144. See Vargas, 477 F3d at 98 (holding that the disparity between sentences in fast-track
and non-fast-track districts is authorized by Congress and therefore not unwarranted under § 3553).
220

221
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The Third Circuit's pre-Kimbrough precedent on the fast-track
disparity, like the precedent in other circuits, depended on the premise
that the fast-track disparity was authorized by the PROTECT Act and
that "any sentencing disparity authorized through an act of Congress
cannot be considered 'unwarranted."'m In Arrelucea-Zamudio, the
court determined that this "interpretation is no longer the view of our
Court in light of Kimbrough's analytic reasoning."27 The Third Circuit's opinion explicitly rejected the interpretation of the PROTECT
Act used by the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits]2 The Court described those decisions as striking a false equivalence: "The crux of the
argument is that the PROTECT Act's congressional directive sanctioning fast-track programs in certain judicial districts necessarily authorizes disparate sentencing of immigration defendants between fasttrack and non-fast-track districts, so that the disparity is not 'unwarranted' under § 3553(a)(6)."2' Like the First Circuit,2m the Third Circuit
reasoned that "[t]he PROTECT Act contains no express congressional fast-track directive that would constrain a sentencing judge's discretion to vary from the Guidelines.". Seeing no statutory bar, the Third
Circuit determined that a sentencing court could consider the fasttrack disparity under the "totality of § 3553(a) factors" 2 guided, "in
particular," by the "parsimony provision.".
In summary, five circuits have now reconsidered the fast-track
disparity question in light of Kimbrough, and a split has developed.
Each court has primarily based its decision on the one-sentence authorization in § 401(m)(2)(B) of the PROTECT Act, as interpreted in
the wake of Kimbrough. One side holds that the disparity is not "un-

226
227

Vargas, 477 F3d at 100.
Arrelucea-Zamudio, 581 F3d at 149. The Third Circuit's explanation of its prior

precedent rule implies a less sticky rule than was announced by either the Eleventh or Ninth
Circuits. Compare id at 149 n 6 ("[A] panel may reevaluate a precedent in light of intervening
authority.") with Vega-Castillo, 540 F3d at 1236-37 (noting that the court is bound by prior
precedent unless it is directly overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court); Gonzalez-Zotelo, 556
F3d at 740 (noting that a panel must follow prior precedent unless a relevant court of last resort
effectively overrules the decision or undercuts its reasoning). See also notes 169-71, 178-79 and
accompanying text.
228 Arrelucea-Zamudio, 581 F3d at 150.
229 Id.
230 See Rodriguez, 527 F3d at 229. See also note 218 and accompanying text.
231 Arrelucea-Zamudio, 581 F3d at 150-51.
232 Id at 149.
233 Id at 155.
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warranted" because Congress must have intended to create the fasttrack disparity." The other side of the split holds that Congress's authorization did not explicitly limit discretion, and therefore does not overcome Kimbrough's presumption in favor of broad judicial discretion.
It is impossible to resolve the split by focusing on the "plain
meaning" of § 401(m)(2)(B) in isolation, because the statute can be
reasonably read to support either side. The Fifth Circuite is correct
that Congress necessarily meant to create a fast-track disparity when
it only authorized fast-track programs in some judicial districts. It
must have been obvious to Congress that by authorizing the programs
in some districts, but not others, a disparity would emerge. Since Congress did not amend § 3553(a) at that time, the appropriate inference
is that Congress did not consider the fast-track disparity to be an "unwarranted disparity" under § 3553(a)(6).3'
But the First Circuit also has a plausible reading of § 401(m)(2)(B).
The authorization does not explicitly restrict judicial discretion. Congress restricted judicial discretion elsewhere in the Feeney Amendment,
but the Supreme Court excised those provisions in Booker.The remaining statute does not explicitly restrict courts from granting belowGuidelines sentences to mitigate the fast-track disparity, and Kimbrough
requires explicit language from Congress to limit judicial discretion.
IV. SOLUTION: REINTERPRETING CONGRESSIONAL INTENT

In attempting to resolve this split, the first step courts have taken
is to look at the plain language of the statute. However, as explained
above, § 401(m)(2)(B) does not offer a clear solution. The typical next
step - assessing
Congress's
specific
intent.. in
enacting
§ 401(m)(2)(B)-is also of limited usefulness for two reasons. First,
"[t]he legislative history of the sentencing provisions ... in the 2003

2
The Fifth Circuit actually argued that Congress explicitly mandated the disparity. See
notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
735 For convenience, this Comment refers to the antidiscretion side of the circuit split as the
"Fifth Circuit" position, while referring to the prodiscretion side as the "First Circuit" position.
2
See Marcial-Santiago,447 F3d at 718 ("By authorizing fast-track programs without
revising the terms of §3553(a)(6), Congress was necessarily providing that the sentencing disparities that result from these programs are warranted and, as such, do not violate § 3553(a)(6).").

237 Consider Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The

Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 Stan L Rev 1833, 1883-85 (1998) (describing two different
types of legislative intent-specific intent versus general legislative purpose); William N. Eskridge,
Philip P. Frickey, and Elizabeth Garrett, Legislation and Statutory Interpretation213-18 (Foundation

2000) (critiquing the specific intent inquiry and explaining its shortcomings-problems of aggregation of intent, attribution of intent, interpretation, and changed circumstances).
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PROTECT Act is somewhat sparse.,,m Second, since the Supreme
Court has eliminated most congressional restrictions on sentencing
discretion, it is impossible to implement Congress's intended limits on
downward departures. Therefore, this Comment focuses on a broader
purposivist inquiry.2 What overarching objectives are detectable in
Congress's thirty-year campaign of sentencing reform? How do these
congressional objectives inform our reading of § 401(m)(2)(B)?
Part IV.A argues that, based on the history of congressional sentencing reform, granting sentencing courts the discretion to mitigate
the fast-track disparity is most supportive of Congress's two broad
goals: imposing harsh sentences and reducing disparities. By contrast,
the approach of the Fifth Circuit imposes harsh sentences for only a
tiny fraction of offenders. Since the vast majority of offenders are already prosecuted in fast-track districts, the aggregate gain from this approach is slight. Further, this approach creates an enormous disparity
between defendants. This Comment argues that the First Circuit's approach is superior-even though it may allow a small increase in lenient
sentences -because it is so supportive of sentencing uniformity.
Part IV.B then argues that granting sentencing courts the discretion to mitigate the fast-track disparity is also more consistent with the
Supreme Court's recent case law. In Kimbrough, the Court noted that
even in the face of congressional disfavor, judges have discretion to
impose below-Guidelines sentences if such sentences are required by
the parsimony clause of § 3553(a).4 Again and again, the Supreme
Court has decreed that sentencing courts have broad authority to craft
individually appropriate sentences. This Comment argues that the
First Circuit's approach is superior because it is more faithful to the
Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence.
A.

Congressional Intent Justifies Granting Sentencing Courts the
Discretion to Mitigate the Fast-Track Disparity

As explained in Part I, over the past thirty years, Congress has
consistently worked toward building a sentencing system that dis238 United States Sentencing Commission, Downward Departures Report at B-28 (cited in
note 31).
29 See Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett, Legislation and Statutory Interpretation at 220-22

(cited in note 237) (defining purposivism as inquiring into a statute's goals and lauding this approach for allowing statutory interpretation to adapt to new circumstances). Consider, as an
analogy, the approach taken by the Court in Booker, 543 US at 246 (seeking to determine what
"Congress would have intended" "had it known" about the unconstitutionality of certain portions of the sentencing statutes).
240 See text accompanying notes 130, 144-48.
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penses harsh sentences and limits unwarranted disparities. Congress's
various attempts to restrict judicial discretion were designed to accomplish these two goals. A solution to the fast-track circuit split
which does not serve these congressional goals is unlikely to be convincing, since they have been central to the last thirty years of sentencing reform. Therefore, this Comment argues that the two sides of this
circuit split should be assessed according to how successfully they
achieve the congressional goals of promoting harsh sentencing and
reducing unwarranted disparities. While limiting judicial discretion
may have supported these congressional goals in other circumstances,
in the context of fast-track programs, such discretion is in fact supportive of Congress's broader goals.
Giving trial courts the discretion to consider the fast-track disparity at sentencing supports the congressional objectives behind the
PROTECT Act by significantly eliminating an odd geographic disparity and only minimally reducing the harshness of sentences. Consider
the weakness of the approach advocated by the Fifth Circuit, wherein
§ 401(m)(2)(B) is interpreted to prohibit courts from considering a
fast-track disparity at sentencing. The few offenders prosecuted in
non-fast-track districts will receive extremely harsh sentences, while
the majority of defendants nationwide receive lenient fast-track sentences. 241 This does not undermine the harshness of sentences. But because it only adds a small number of severe sentences, it does little to
increase the nationwide aggregate harshness of sentences for all of
these offenders. And this interpretation maintains the significant disparity between defendants in fast-track districts and those sentenced in
other jurisdictions. Again, this only implicates the handful of offenders
prosecuted in non-fast-track districts, but the disparity is enormous: in
the cases underlying the circuit split, the disparity amounted to an increase in sentence length of roughly 50 to 100 percent.
At first blush, the increase in disparity seems balanced by the increase in harshness: defendants charged in non-fast-track districts suffer a significant disparity, but receive significantly harsher sentences.
But harshness without uniformity was never Congress's intention. The
conservative side of the SRA coalition wanted to eliminate the lenien241 See United States Sentencing Commission, Final Report on the Impact of United States
v Booker on Federal Sentencing 141-42 (2006) (citing statistics demonstrating that very few
immigration cases are sentenced in the seventy-eight non-fast-track districts, and that the sentences imposed in non-fast-track districts rarely include downward departures). In 2007, for
example, more than 79 percent of immigration cases were sentenced in the sixteen districts with
fast-track programs for illegal reentry. Author's analysis of Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal
Justice Statistics Resource Center, online at http://fjsrc.urban.org (visited Nov 14, 2009).
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cy of discretionary sentencing, but it was always thought that leniency
would be eliminated through forced uniformity. "[T]he [Sentencing
Reform] [A]ct and its legislative history demonstrate that Congress's
overriding concern was to reduce disparity thought to result from the
exercise of judicial discretion in sentencing."242 Randomized harshness
was certainly never the goal. "Conservatives and law enforcement
interests" pushed for determinate sentencing for two main reasons.
First, they wanted to end the practice of parole boards "releas[ing]
prisoners who continued to pose a danger to society."2 4 Second, they
believed that requiring clear, determinate sentences would induce
judges to incarcerate more defendants, which, "in turn, might increase
the deterrent and incapacitative effects of the criminal law."... Even
when pressing for a harsher sentencing regime, conservatives clearly
advocated a sentencing regime that was uniformm
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit's approach would hardly seem desirable to the liberals who "expressed particular concern that permitting the exercise of discretion compromised the ideal of equal treatment under the law." Liberal reformers would not have interpreted
this significant disparity as counterbalanced by the increase in harshness. To see those two in balance requires conceptualizing unwarranted disparities as a problem solely for the archetypal frustrated
prisoner, suffering a disparately harsh sentence in a non-fast-track
district. But liberal reformers believed that unwarranted disparities
were broadly and "fundamentally at odds with ideals of equality and
the rule of law."2 48Unwarranted disparities are not just a problem for
242

Anderson, Kling, and Stith, 42 J L & Econ at 272 (cited in note 16).

243

Jonathan D. Casper, Determinate Sentencing and Prison Crowding in Illinois, 1984 U Ill

L Rev 231, 236.
244 Id (noting that evidence on recidivism suggested that parole boards were not very good
at determining when prisoners had been rehabilitated).
245 Id. See also note 95 and accompanying text.
246 Reform of the FederalCriminalLaws, Hearings on SB 1437 before the Subcommittee on
Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong, 1st Sess 8575,
8580-81 (June 7, 1977) (statement of Sen Lloyd Bentsen) ("We see a situation where a judge in
one part of the country gives them a tap on the wrist. In another part of the country, they may be
sentenced for an exceedingly long period of time for, in effect, the same crime."); id at 8996-97
(June 20, 1977) (statement of Ronald L. Gainer, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Office for Improvements in the Administration of Criminal Justice) (arguing that sentencing
disparities are unfair and undermine the deterrent effect of the criminal justice process).
247 Anderson, Kling, and Stith, 42 J L & Econ at 272 (cited in note 16).
248 Stith and Koh, 28 Wake Forest L Rev at 227 (cited in note 13). See also Frankel, Criminal Sentences at 7 (cited in note 11) ("The result ... [of indeterminate sentencing] is a wild array
of sentencing judgments without any semblance of the consistency demanded by the ideal of
equal justice.").
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the defendant who suffers an unfairly harsh sentence; disparities pose
a justice problem for the system as a whole. On this broader view, the
equities are no longer in balance. Since only a small minority of defendants are prosecuted in non-fast-track districts, the Fifth Circuit's
approach causes a small increase in aggregate harshness. But the Fifth
Circuit's approach creates a fundamental nationwide inequality that is
contrary to equal treatment under the law.
Permitting sentencing courts to mitigate the fast-track disparity
better supports the goals of harshness and uniformity. Admittedly, the
harshness of some sentences would be diminished. If courts in nonfast-track districts are permitted to give below-Guidelines sentences,
then the small fraction of offenders prosecuted for these offenses in
non-fast-track districts could receive more lenient sentences. But
because only a small fraction of these offenses are prosecuted in nonfast-track districts, this interpretation of the PROTECT Act does little
to undermine the aggregate harshness of sentences. More importantly,
this approach allows sentencing courts to mitigate an astonishingly
large disparity.
This argument focuses on promoting the congressional goals of
harsh sentencing and reducing unwarranted disparities for two reasons-because Congress has consistently advocated those goals, and
because legislators actually justified fast-track sentencing as a way to
promote a broad form of harshness and uniformity?' Admittedly, "the
[Sentencing Reform] [A]ct and its legislative history demonstrate that
Congress's overriding concern was to reduce disparity thought to result from the exercise of judicial discretion in sentencing."2' But, in the
fast-track case, ironically, the only way to reduce disparity is actually
to increasejudicial discretion.
There are counterarguments to this Comment's proposed solution.
One argument is that Congress's authorization of lenient fast-track
programs in only some districts seems, on its face, to directly conflict
with the broader congressional goals of harsh and uniform sentences.
The argument is that a solution to the fast-track split should not prioritize those overarching goals when Congress seems to have rejected them
249 This may not add more below-Guidelines sentences if without the "unwarranted disparity" argument, sentencing courts are already imposing lenient sentences under less contested
§ 3553(a) factors. Or perhaps there will not be more below-Guidelines sentences because courts
will decline to impose below-Guidelines sentences in these cases because they do not find the
disparity unwarranted, or because the defendants are otherwise undeserving of such a downward
departure.
250 See notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
251 Anderson, Kling, and Stith, 42 J L & Econ at 272 (cited in note 16).
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in §401(m)(2)(B). However, this concern is addressed by either of two
responses. First, there is a narrow response, which focuses on the
PROTECT Act's restrictions on fast-track programs. Second, there is a
broad response, which looks at how fast-track programs promote
harshness and prevent unwarranted disparities in the aggregate.
The narrow response is that the PROTECT Act imposed significant restrictions on downward departures compared to then-existing
fast-track programs. Prior to §401(m)(2)(B), prosecutors used fasttrack sentencing in roughly half of all judicial districts, 5 the programs
were inconsistent, and some of them granted enormous sentence reductions.3' Section 401(m)(2)(B) is only one sentence long, but it restricted
the offense-level reduction to four levels, and required each program to
be authorized by both the Attorney General and the local US Attorney.
If one interprets fast-track programs as promoting leniency and disparity, then the PROTECT Act is a tough restriction on those programs.
Congress's goal was to reduce disparities and increase harshness.
The broad response is that fast-track sentencing is supportive of
harsh sentences and reduces unwarranted disparities if one considers
the aggregate universe of offenders, not just those who are apprehended and sentenced.54 Pre-fast-track, prosecutors imposed harsh
sentences on a tiny fraction of offenders but did not charge the vast
majority. Fast-track programs allow prosecutors to charge more offenders, thereby increasing aggregate harshness. Also, without fast
track, a few offenders are sentenced harshly, while the vast majority of
offenders are not prosecuted at all."' Congressman Feeney specifically
declared that the fast-track authorization in § 401(m)(2)(B) was designed to reduce this intradistrict disparity." Thus, by taking a broader
look at the entire class of offenders, and not just those offenders
252 United States Sentencing Commission, Downward Departures Report at 64 (cited in
note 31).
253 See, for example, Bersin and Feigin, 12 Georgetown Immig L J at 300-02 (cited in
note 40) (describing how defendants subject to a maximum penalty of twenty years were permitted to plead to a lesser charge carrying a maximum sentence of only two years).
254 For an example of this broad conception of the criminal justice system, see Gary S.

Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J Polit Econ 169, 176-79 (1968)

(asserting that the expected utility, or disutility, of a criminal offense is a function of both the
severity of the proscribed penalty and the probability of that sentence being imposed). The "deterrent" purpose of sentencing in §3553(a)(2)(B) justifies this aggregate definition for harshness.
The other purposes of sentencing are not implicated because this Comment assumes that fasttrack sentences, already available to roughly 80 percent of offenders, adequately serves these
purposes. See note 241.
255 See notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
256 See note 77.
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charged by prosecutors, one sees that Congress actually did increase
the harshness and uniformity of sentencing when it authorized fasttrack sentencing.
Another potential counterargument is that Congress passed a statute that necessarily created a disparity. While Congress generally advocates for harshness and reducing disparities, the simple text of this
statute creates a disparity, and therefore, courts should not have the
discretion to mitigate it. This reasoning only makes sense because
Congress was legislating against a background rule of mandatory
Guidelines and limited judicial discretion. Without mandatory Guidelines, § 401(m)(2)(B) does not necessarily create a disparity. So, this
counterargument, dependent as it is on an implied background of limited judicial discretion, is no longer convincing. Recent Supreme
Court decisions now hold that judicial discretion is robust and cannot
be undermined even by implicit congressional intentions.
Recent Supreme Court Jurisprudence Strongly Supports Discretion

B.

The Supreme Court's recent sentencing decisions also militate in
favor of the First Circuit's approach to the fast-track circuit split. As
Part II explained, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that sentencing courts have broad discretion to decide the appropriate sentence for each defendant. The Court has held that sentencing decisions
are entitled to deferential appellate review. It has unshackled sentencing courts from the mandatory Guidelines.2" The Court has reaffirmed a deferential "abuse-of-discretion" standard for appellate review.25 It has also held that appellate courts may not presume that
non-Guidelines sentences are unreasonable, nor may they demand
extraordinary circumstances for sentences far outside the Guidelines.m The Guidelines are so advisory that a sentencing court may not
even presume a Guidelines sentence to be reasonable5' When the
Fourth Circuit affirmed a sentencing court decision that had mistakenly stated that the Guidelines were presumptively reasonable, the Supreme Court summarily reversed.m
Instead of binding sentencing courts to mandatory Guidelines or
strict appellate review, the Supreme Court has consistently held that
2
258
2
260
261
262

Gall, 552 US at 41.
See Booker, 543 US at 245, 259.
Gall,552 US at 41.
See id at 47; Rita, 551 US at 345-56.
Rita, 551 US at 351.
See Nelson v United States, 129 S Ct 890, 892 (2009) (per curiam).
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courts have broad freedom under the discretionary factors of
§ 3553(a). In Booker, the Court held that sentencing courts should
"tailor the sentence in light of ... § 3553(a)" rather than deferring com-

pletely to the Guidelines." In Gall, the Court held that the core of the
sentencing decision was an analysis of whether the §3553(a) factors
supported the sentence suggested by either party. Even the government admitted in Kimbrough that sentencing courts have a "general
freedom ... to apply the [§ 3553(a)] factors."m Overall, the Supreme

Court's decisions "emphasiz[e] the breadth of a district court's discretion to deviate from a defendant's [Guidelines range] based on the
compendium of sentencing factors mentioned in 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)."266
In addition to holding that sentencing courts have broad discretion under § 3553(a), the Kimbrough Court made two key arguments
that support this Comment's solution. First, Congress can only cabin
judicial discretion with explicit legislative action, such as when it passes
statutory minimum sentences. The weakness of the Fifth Circuit's approach is that it completely fails to identify any explicit congressional
limit on judicial discretion.267 Pre-Kimbrough precedent from all circuits states that the fast-track disparity was only created "implicitly"
or "necessarily"; 8 even the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits continue to
note that Congress never explicitly mandated the fast-track disparity.'
Kimbrough's second key point was that a sentencing court has
the discretion, under the parsimony clause of § 3553(a), to find that a
governmentally created disparity results in sentences that are "greater
than necessary" to serve the purposes of sentencing. Instead of relying
on § 3553(a)(6), this argument runs from the parsimony principle. If a
government-endorsed disparity is wrongheaded, then defendants on
the harsh end of the disparity wrongly receive sentences that are
"greater than necessary." As the Third Circuit held, a sentencing court
may "consider the disparate treatment of immigration defendants that
is created by fast-track programs in determining whether a Guidelines
sentence is greater than necessary under the § 3553(a) factors."2 0 As
the First Circuit suggested, "even if a specific sentencing rationale
26

543 US at 245. See also id at 261.
552 US at 49-50.
552 US at 102.
266 Rodriguez, 527 F3d at 225.
267 See note 163 and accompanying text.
268 Id. See also note 152.
269 See notes 175,194, and accompanying text.
270 Arrelucea-Zamudio, 581 F3d at 149 (emphasis added) ("The fast-track issue should not
be confined to subsection (a)(6).").
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cannot be considered under the aegis of a particular sub-part of section 3553(a), such a proscription does not bar consideration of that
factor in the course of a more holistic review of the full panoply of
section 3553(a) factors."2"
Further support for the application of the parsimony principle
stems from Kimbrough's holding that courts do not have to pay respect to Guidelines that "do not exemplify the Commission's exercise
of its characteristic institutional role."7'2 The USSC did not use its empirical process to develop the fast-track policy statement -instead it
cued the text directly off of Congress's suggestion273-just as it did
when writing the crack cocaine guidelines.274 And, of course, the USSC
was always critical of the fast-track disparity.27 '
In the face of this recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, the remaining counterarguments seem quite weak. First, the Fifth Circuit
distinguished Kimbrough as a disagreement with Guidelines policy,
implying that fast-track mitigation requires disagreement with congressional policy, something that is beyond the authority of a sentenc276
ing court. But the government conceded this argument in recent filings by the Solicitor General, noting that the Supreme Court held in
Kimbrough that a sentencing judge may "disagree[] with implicit congressional policy determinations that are expressed solely through
directives to the Sentencing Commission.".... This is in keeping with the

Booker Court's conclusion that it is not "possible to leave the Guidelines [ ] binding" in some cases and advisory in others.27 As this Comment was going to press, further developments have made it clear that
the distinction between congressional and Guidelines policy does not
distinguish the fast-track issue from Kimbrough. The fast-track policy
statement at USSG §5K3.1 is one of many sentencing provisions

271
272

Rodriguez, 527 F3d at 229.

552 US 109.
United States Sentencing Commission, Downward Departures Report at 66-67 (cited in
note 31) ("The Department of Justice requested that the Commission implement the directive
regarding the early disposition programs in section 401(m) of the PROTECT Act in a similar
unfettered manner by merely restating the legislative language.").
274 Id at 109-10.
275 Id at 66--67.
276 See notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
277 Brief for the United States in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari, Gomez-Herrera v
United States, No 08-5226, *9 (US filed Oct 10, 2008) ("Gomez-Herrera Cert Opposition Brief"),
citing Kimbrough, 552 US at 102-03. See also Brief for the United States in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari, Vega-Castillo v United States, No 08-8655, *12 (US filed May 20, 2009), citing
Kimbrough, 552 US at 102-03.
278 Booker, 543 US at 266.
273
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crafted in response to a congressional mandate. In a sentencing dispute at the Supreme Court regarding how to interpret another one of
these Guidelines, USSG § 4B1.1,m the Solicitor General has again reiterated that she interprets all Guidelines to be advisory-even those
mandated by a statutory act of Congress.m In response to the Solicitor
General's briefing the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the
Eleventh Circuit's decision below, and remanded the case "for further
consideration in light of the position asserted by the Solicitor General
in her brief filed for the United States." 2 The connection between the
fast-track debate should not be minimized; the Eleventh Circuit's discredited opinion extensively cited the fast-track opinions from the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits as persuasive authority. m The Supreme
Court is unlikely to be convinced that Kimbrough does not apply to
the fast-track debate because of an implicit congressional warrant in
the PROTECT Act.
Second, some courts invoke their prior precedent rules to avoid
overturning pre-Kimbrough case law. At best, this is a legitimate
avoidance of the debate's merits, but it simply requires the Supreme
Court to accept certiorari in order to resolve the debate.m At worst,
hiding behind a prior precedent rule is a disingenuous attempt to
avoid the lawful ruling.2
279 USSG § 4B1.1 ensures that adult defendants convicted of their third "crime of violence
or [ I controlled substance offense" receive extremely punitive sentences. The Guideline was
created in response to the statutory order in 28 USC § 994(h) requiring that "[t]he Commission
shall assure that the guidelines specify a sentence to a term of imprisonment at or near the maximum term authorized for" this category of career offenders.
280 Brief for the United States in Support of the Petition for Certiorari, Vazquez v United
States, No 09-5370, *9-11 (US filed Nov 16,2009) (available on Westlaw at 2009 WL 5423020).
281 Vazquez v United States, 2010 WL 154871 (US).
282 See United States v Vazquez, 558 E3d 1224,1229 (11th Cir 2009) (citing Gomez-Herreraand
Vega-Castillo for the proposition that where a "policy was expressly driven by Congress, a district court
may not consider its disagreement with this policy in making its sentencing decisions").
283 The Court has requested a government response to the certorari petitions filed in Gomez-Herrera, Vega-Castillo, and Gonzalez-Zotelo. See note 277; Brief for the United States in
Opposition to Petition for Certiorari, United States v Gonzalez-Zotelo, No 08-10326, *11 (US
filed Aug 5,2009). The Court declined to grant certiorari in all three cases. See Gomez-Herrerav
United States, 129 S Ct 624 (2008); Vega-Castillo v United States, 129 S Ct 2825 (2009); GonzalezZotelo v United States, 2009 WL 1344552 (US). Requesting the views of the Solicitor General
three times in one term suggests that the Court is quite interested in granting certiorari. See
David C.Thompson and Melanie F Wachtell, An EmpiricalAnalysis of Supreme Court Certiorari

Petition Procedures:The Call for Response and the Call for the Views of the Solicitor General, 16

Geo Mason L Rev 237, 273-77 (2009) (using empirical data to demonstrate that the court is
thirty-seven times more likely to grant petitions for certiorari when it calls for the view of the
Solicitor General than when it does not).
2
See notes 178-79 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Barkett's vigorous dissent in
Vega-Castillo).
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Third, courts note that non-fast-track defendants are not similarly
situated to fast-track defendants because they have not waived their
rights in the same way fast-track defendants do." Normatively, it
seems unfair to ask defendants to waive substantive rights without a
contemporaneous offer of a reduced sentence," and, of course, defendants can avoid this niggling complaint by offering a conditional waiver of all fast-track rights except for the right to appeal on this issue.2
Finally, the government claims that the First Circuit's approach
infringes on prosecutorial discretion. But by congressional statute,
the "court" imposes sentences under § 3553(a), not the US Attorney.
Even in fast-track bargains, the sentence must meet judicial approval
before it can be imposed.m In a variety of other situations -for example, co-conspirator disparity9 and reduction for substantial assistancem-a sentencing court has the discretion to impose a sentence
reduction even in the face of the prosecutor's discretionary decision
not to ask for such a reduction. Sentencing, in the end, is an "unquestionably judicial function."m
In summation, it is contradictory to the discretionary trend in the
Supreme Court's recent case law to read § 401(m)(2)(B) as a flat ban
on mitigating the fast-track disparity. The Supreme Court has clearly
dictated that sentencing courts are to have broad discretion in imposSee note 169.
See Rodriguez, 527 F3d at 230-31 ("Lacking the benefit of the bargain inherent in fasttrack programs, a defendant cannot be expected to renounce his right to mount a defense.").
2
Alternatively, the Third Circuit suggests that the defendant "must demonstrate that he
would have taken the fast-track guilty plea if offered (and, in so doing, waived his appellate
rights, including his habeas rights but for ineffective assistance of counsel)." Arrelucea-Zamudio,
581 F3d at 156.
288 Gomez-Herrera Cert Opposition Brief at *10 (cited in note 277) (characterizing the decisions to create fast-track programs and offer participation to certain defendants as "classic exercises
of prosecutorial discretion").
285
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289

See Michael M. O'Hear, The Duty to Avoid Disparity: Implementing 18 US.C

§ 3553(a)(6) after Booker, 37 McGeorge L Rev 627, 635, 643 (2006) (concluding, in light of "the
language and structure of" § 3553(a)(6),"that the judiciary is authorized to make an independent
evaluation ... of what sorts of disparities are unwarranted") (emphasis added).
290 The sentencing court can reject a plea agreement under FRCrP 11(c)(1)(C). See Arrelucea-Zamudio, 581 F3d at 151.
291 See, for example, United States v Statham, 581 F3d 548, 556 (7th Cir 2009) (stating that a
sentencing court may be permitted to grant a below-Guidelines sentence under § 3553(a)(6)
"because of a disparity with the sentence of a co-defendant").
292 See, for example, United States v Parker,462 F3d 273, 277 n 5 (3d Cir 2006) (noting that
a
district judge may find an unwarranted disparity where a prosecutor has made a motion for a "substantial assistance" downward departure for one, but not all, similarly situated codefendants).
293 Rodriguez, 527 F3d at 230 (reasoning that there are "no separation of powers concerns

here").
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ing sentences under § 3553(a). Perhaps below-Guidelines sentences in
fast-track disparity cases deserve "closer [appellate] review," but a
blanket prohibition is inconsistent with a district court's broad authority in sentencing. The First Circuit's approach is much more faithful to
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION

The correct solution to this split is to grant sentencing courts in
non-fast-track districts the discretion to mitigate the fast-track disparity. Though it comes at a small cost to the overall length of time served
for these offenses, this approach has the potential to eliminate a massive sentencing disparity. Additionally, this approach is more faithful
to the Supreme Court's recent decisions expanding judicial discretion.
The legislative history, Congress's overarching sentencing purposes,
and Supreme Court case law all justify granting more discretion, rather than less, to resolve this circuit split.

294 Kimbrough, 552 US at 109 (noting that more stringent appellate review might be necessary when the sentencing judge departs from the Guidelines based solely on the judge's belief
that the Guidelines range does not properly reflect the § 3553(a) factors).

IaB-t-

